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China as G20 Host in 2016: Dawn of Asian Global Leadership? 
 
Gregory Chin and Hugo Dobson outline possible approaches for China's turn as G20 
president. 
 
On 16 November 2014, the last day of the G20 summit in Brisbane, Australian Prime 
Minister Tony Abbot announced that the members of the G20 had agreed that China would 
host the summit in 2016. This decLVLRQGUHZEDUHO\DQ\DWWHQWLRQIURPWKHZRUOG¶VPHGLD<HW
WKHUHLVGHHSHUVLJQLILFDQFHEHKLQGWKLVDQQRXQFHPHQWLQWHUPVRI$VLD¶VSRWHQWLDOUROHLQ
global leadership. 
 
Within the Club of 20, the announcement was the culmination of the agreement that ± after 
the so-FDOOHG³WURLND´RI5XVVLDLQ$XVWUDOLDLQDQG7XUNH\LQ± WKH³DQQXDO
presidencies of the G20 will be chosen from rotating regional groups, starting with the Asian 
JURXSLQJFRPSULVLQJRI&KLQD,QGRQHVLD-DSDQDQG.RUHD´ 
 
The $XVWUDOLDQ30HPSKDVL]HGWKDWDQ³RYHUZKHOPLQJQXPEHURI*PHPEHUV´KDG
supported the choice of China as the host of the 2016 summit. However, beneath the surface, 
tensions had been simmering between the two largest economies in the East Asian region, 
China and Japan for the last decade, and particularly since 2010. Locked in a territorial 
dispute over a set of small islands in the sea between China and Japan, it was said that both 
Beijing and Tokyo wanted to host, in part, to out-do the other. Some G20 observers 
speculated that Indonesia might turn out to be the compromise candidate (South Korea 
already hosted in 2010, and was not in the running this time). 
 
Looking back, it was hard to bet against a so-FDOOHG³ULVLQJ&KLQD´%XWKHUHWRIRUH&KLQDZDV
conspicuous by its absence as a summit host. This was especially notable considering its rise 
to global prominence amid the 2008-9 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), and its aftermath. 
Instead, it was the old G7 who monopolized the hosting of the early G20 summits ± 
Washington, London, Pittsburgh, Toronto, [Seoul], Cannes ± and only thereafter that the 
middle and rising powers had a look-in ± Los Cabos, St Petersburg, and Brisbane. 
 
Some voices within China and some outside had called on China to step up and play a bigger 
role in global governance, especially in the wake of the GFC, and as befitting of the reality of 
its position as a great power (returned). At the same time, there are, and will continue to be, 
PDQ\ZKRTXHVWLRQ&KLQD¶VFDSDELOLW\WRH[HUFLVHJOREDl leadership. 
 
Until recently, Beijing has side-stepped the host function, and approached the G20 process as 
a transitionary coordination mechanism rather than a permanent grouping (Chin 2010). But 
&KLQD¶VQHZOHDGHULVGLIIHUHQWIURPKLVLPPHGLDWHSUHGHFHssors, in terms of ambition, and a 
willingness to act on those ambitions. It is no longer head bowed. President Xi Jinping has set 
what most can agree is a commanding presence, not only domestically with the anti-
corruption campaign, but also internationally, by calling for a more prominent role for China 
in the world, and supporting the launch of a host of new China-led international arrangements, 
that include a large measure of Chinese financial diplomacy such as the BRICS bank, and the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In pondering about 2016, the Chinese President and 
senior strategists decided that the time is ripe for China to host the G20 summit ± and their 
diplomats pressed the case. 
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Nonetheless, Tokyo could not be counted out, especially with the current Japanese Prime 
0LQLVWHU¶VGHVLUHWRFXWDPRUHUREXVWLQWHUQDWLRQDOSURILOHIRU-DSDQ8QGHU$EH6KLQ]RWKHUH
KDVEHHQDVKLIWDZD\IURP-DSDQ¶VWUDGLWLRQDOOLEHUDOSDFLILVW-oriented internationalist role 
towards a more hard-nosed Realism. Some might even say that Abe has instrumentalized the 
mechanisms of global governance for the promotion of Abenomics and more proactive 
contributions from Japan particularly in terms of international security. In an attempt to 
secure the role of G20 host, PriPH0LQLVWHU$EHZRXOGKDYHORRNHGWROHDQRQ-DSDQ¶V
traditional G7/8 allies for special backing from the older club of great powers, in addition to 
support from newer allies such as India and Australia. 
 
In the end, the G20 decided it would be China. Many of the members of the self-styled 
³SUHPLHUIRUXP´IRUPDQDJLQJWKHJOREDOHFRQRP\GHFLGHGLWZDVWLPHIRU&KLQDWRUHFHLYH
its due in global power-sharing and also to step up more on global burden-sharing. 
 
For Tokyo, there was undoubtedly some disappointment. The Japanese media reported that 
Japan had sought the G20 presidency, but was hindered by its recent revolving door of 
-DSDQHVHSULPHPLQLVWHUVDQGZDVOHIWGLVDSSRLQWHGRQFHDJDLQGHVSLWHUHFHLYLQJ$EERW¶V
initial endorsement (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 15 November 2014, evening edition). 
 
$OWKRXJKWKHGHFLVLRQZDV³ZDUPO\ZHOFRPHG´E\&KLQD¶VOHDGHUVWKLVLVQRWDWLPHWRVWDQG
still. Beijing now inherits the mantle ± or, more accurately, the challenge ± of Asian 
leadership in the world. 
 
During the last decade, prominent Asian opinion shapers have called for Asia to play a bigger 
role in shaping the global agenda. Others inside the region have called on Asian nations to 
coordinate more and better between themselves, and in the global arena, especially on global 
financial stability and on maintaining an open world trading system. These are bedrock issues 
of the G20 agenda. While some have hoped for the emergence of more formal regional 
caucusing in Asia, (questioned by Dobson 2011), others remain sceptical about the possibility 
IRUFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQZLWKLQWKHUHJLRQLQFOXGLQJ&KLQD¶VDFWXDOFRPPLWPHQWWR
multilateralism. So far, there has been little coordination between East Asian members of the 
G20, except for, perhaps, during the year when Korea held the revolving presidency. 
 
Beijing welcomes the host decision as it provides another opportunity, alongside the 2014 
APEC presidency, the establishment of the aforementioned new multilateral development 
banks, and a slew of other new international funds, for China to make its presence felt in 
international society. One cynic called the decision Beijing smog winning out over Japanese 
radioactivity (Record China, 19 November 2014). More to the point, it presents China with 
an unparalleled opportunity to reach out to its Asian neighbours, and others, to build a set of 
shared positions on the agenda, priorities and key deliverables for the upcoming summit in 
2016. 
 
$VKRVW&KLQDZLOOIDFHWKHFKDOOHQJHRIEXLOGLQJRQ7XUNH\¶VHIIRUWVLQ$QWDO\DLQ
November 2015. It is important for China and its regional neighbours to act on this 
unprecedented opportunity to breathe new life into the G20 growth and development agenda, 
that has been stymied by the ongoing Eurozone crisis, or distracted by the national priorities 
of revolving host presidencies (in countries which have looked to punch diplomatically above 
their weight). A revitalized G20 could help the global community move toward new 
IUDPHZRUNVIRUJOREDOJRYHUQDQFHIRUPDQDJLQJWKHZRUOGHFRQRP\IRU³VWDEOHEalanced 
DQGVXVWDLQDEOH´JURZWKDQGGHYHORSPHQWFRPLQJRXWRIWKH-9 GFC. 
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At first blush, there is reasonable cause for pessimism, especially on Asian global leadership. 
Sino-Japanese tensions have run high for the past decade, especially since 2010, and have 
only abated very recently, with the awkward handshake between President Xi and Prime 
Minister Abe at the APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014. At a more fundamental 
level, the two countries have differing preferences on the central mechanisms for global 
governance, with Tokyo displaying a clear preference for the more exclusive club of the G7/8, 
and Beijing backing the more unwieldy G20 from the get-JR-DSDQ¶VSUHIHUHQFHVKDYHDW
times, led to inconsistent, compromised and contradictory behaviour within the G20 process. 
It has sought to behave as a responsible member of the G20, but does not want the larger club 
to succeed at the expense of the G7/8. 
 
7RN\R¶VDPELJXLW\XQGHUPLQHVWKHFRKHUHQFHRILWVDSSURDFKWRJOREDOJRYHUQDQFHZLWKLQWKH
G20, while its support for the G7 seems to constrain its commitment to greater regional 
cooperation. Nonetheless, Japan continues to be an influential force within the region, and 
JOREDOO\DQGLWLVLQ&KLQD¶VLQWHUHVWVDVZHOODV-DSDQ¶VWRVWDELOL]HWKHLUUHODWLRQVKLSJRLQJ
forward. The return of Japan, China and South Korean finance officials, recently, to their 
trilateral cooperation meetings in September 2014 ± after a two-year hiatus ± is indicative of 
awareness on all sides, at a deeper level, of the need for the largest economies in East Asia to 
cooperate and coordinate. At least at the official level of financial ministries, and foreign 
affairs ministries, efforts are now ongoing to smooth over the geopolitical tensions, and 
return to cooperation within the region. 
 
China needs to take a robust engagement approach to its turn as G20 president, as the summit 
in 2016 provides a platform for China and the Asian neighbours to present fresh ideas and 
approaches to solving issues of shared interest, and global need, such as securing financial 
stability, supporting infrastructure development and modernization across the world, the 
financing of environmental protection, and energy supply and consumption ± matters of 
importance to all. In terms of summit architecture, China (Japan, South Korea, Indonesia) and 
Asia would make a pioneering contribution by providing 3-years of funding to establish a 
new G20 Coordination Office, to be headquartered in a key international hub such as 
Singapore, which could be tasked with providing a measure of continuity amid the revolving 
presidency, and oversight on follow-through on the summit agenda. 
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